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Abstract: This paper studies changes in voting preferences over election campaigns. Building on the 
literature on spatial models and valence issues, we study whether 1) ideological distance to political 
parties, 2) assessments of partiesÕ competence to handle different policy issues, and 3) votersÕ updating of 
candidatesÕ evaluations are factors that explain shifts in votersÕ choice in the weeks preceding the 
election. To test our hypotheses we use data from three survey panels conducted for the 2008, 2011 and 
2015 Spanish general elections. Our findings show that valence factors are more influential than 
ideological indifference to account for campaign conversion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
If we consider elections to be Òcritical democratic instrumentsÓ (Powell 2000, p. 2) and parties as mainly 
vote-seekers (Downs 1957), election campaigns become one of the most important phenomena in the 
democratic process. It is at this time when parties maximize their efforts to influence votersÕ decision-
making in order to win elections. Campaigns are relevant for three main reasons. First, some voters make 
their electoral choice in the campaign period (Finkel 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995; Shaw 1999; 
Whiteley and Seyd 2003; Issenberg 2012). Second, parties provide more information about their 
platforms during the campaign, so this is the perfect time to shape voting preferences (Popkin 1991; Shaw 
1999; Simon 2002; Clinton and Lapinski 2004; Franz and Rideout 2007; Greene 2011). Finally, 
campaigns are consequential even for candidates who do not expect to win the election, since to remain in 
politics they have to garner an acceptable vote share in the eyes of party elites (Gosnell 1950).  
 
Early research on election campaigns mostly focused on their minimal effects. According to received 
wisdom, the main value of campaigns was to reinforce previous party choices (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; 
Berelson et al. 1954). The only relevant persuasion effect of campaigns seemed to be to mobilize voters 
that otherwise would not turn out on Election Day (Gerber and Green 2000; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; 
Hillygus 2005; McClurg and Holbrook 2009). As a result, the impact of campaigns on changing prior 
vote choices drew scant academic attention. It could be argued, however, that this is no longer the case. 
Following the unfreezing of party systems, many established democracies have recorded high levels of 
electoral volatility (Mair 2005). Either as a consequence of new party entry or vote switching, partiesÕ 
vote shares have become less stable over elections (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). And campaigns 
contribute to explain this pattern of electoral outcomes. 
 
This article examines changes in reported vote choice during the election campaign. More specifically, we 
study the determinants of conversion as a campaign effect. Following the literature, we define conversion 
as the switch in party choice during the campaign period. Conversion is important for both parties and 
voters. For parties, because it means not only that one party increases its vote share, but also that its rivals 
diminish theirs. The relevance for voters is noteworthy in the case of the 2015 Spanish general election, in 
which the emergence of two new parties provided voters with more alternatives to change their party 
choice. According to our findings, valence factors such as heterogeneous assessments of partiesÕ 
competence across policy issues and changes in candidatesÕ evaluations are more influential than votersÕ 
ideological indifference over parties to account for the instability of party choice in the campaign period. 
 
The novelty of our paper is twofold. First, we examine the effect of ideology and valence in a dynamic 
setting (i.e., conversion during a campaign) rather than a static one (i.e., determinants of vote choice). Of 
course, studying the impact of valence issues and ideological position is far from being new. Previous 
studies have found valence effects in the context of the decline of ideological voting for Canada (Blanger 
and Meguid 2008), the United Kingdom (Clarke et al. 2004) and the United States (Stone and Simas 
2010). But if this pattern is clear for first-past-the-post systems where the Downsian model predicts an 
ideological convergence of parties, its application to multi-party contexts remains an empirical open 
question. Secondly, we contribute to the existing literature by framing the conversion effect of election 
campaigns on swing voters during a period of political transformation from a two-party system to a multi-
party system. The literature on elections has mainly focused on the determinants of party choice without 
distinguishing between stable and unstable voters. Yet, in a context of increasing volatility it is interesting 
to understand whether citizensÕ incentives to switch their vote are the same than lead them to prefer one 
party in the first place.  
 
To test our hypotheses we take advantage of panel survey data collected by the Center for Sociological 
Research (Centro de Investigaciones Sociolgicas CIS) for the three Spanish general elections held 
between 2008 and 2015. The three panels consist of a pre- and post-election survey with data about 
votersÕ characteristics and attitudes on issues and towards candidates. Spain is an interesting case study 
because of its recent transformation from a stable de facto two-party system to a multi-party system.  
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on campaign effects and 
develops our hypotheses to explain voting dynamics over the campaign. Section 3 presents the Spanish 
system. Section 4 deals with data and methods. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. The effect of election campaigns 
 
To maximize its share of votes, a party needs not only to keep its core voters, but also to attract voters that 
either lean towards other parties (swing voters) or are less likely to participate in the election (potential 
non-voters). For this reason, election campaigns are a key instrument in the repertoire that parties employ 
to gain office. Even more importantly, the temporal proximity to the election turns campaigns into the 
ideal period to maximize partiesÕ support among the electorate because the expected return to the 
mobilization effort is greater. Hence, parties have to heighten attention to their platforms and candidates  
to influence the election outcome and increase their policy and portfolios rewards because the effects of 
campaigning are Òlarge enoughÓ to be important (Campbell 2000, p. 188).  
 
The literature has usually distinguished three main effects of campaigns. First, campaigns can lead to the 
reinforcement of prior vote intentions. Empirical research finds that this effect is generally prevalent 
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Finkel 1993; Iyengar and Simon 2000; 
Martnez i Coma 2008). Finkel and Schrott (1995) call reinforced individuals Òstable votersÓ. In this vein, 
we could consider campaign reinforcement as a Ònon effectÓ or as the Òreference outcomeÓ, as reinforced 
voters report a post-election choice that was unchanged by the campaign.  
 
Another effect of campaigns is activation (or mobilization). Campaigns can induce the participation of 
voters who otherwise would have abstained. There is plenty of research showing that campaigns increase 
turnout on Election Day (Gerber and Green 2000; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Hillygus 2005; McClurg 
and Holbrook 2009). This effect takes place either by increasing the awareness about the stakes of the 
election or by convincing voters to make a choice consistent with their social background, party 
identification or personal ideology (Gelman and King 1993; Finkel and Schrott 1995; Jamieson 2001; 
Fournier 2006; Kam 2006). 
 
Third, campaigns can also lead to votersÕ conversion. The amount of accessible political information is 
greater in the campaign period than at any other time.1 We expect some citizens to switch their vote 
intention over the course of the campaign, as they collect new information that changes their prior party 
preference. Furthermore, recent studies (Hillygus and Shield 2009; Willmann 2011; Gallego and Rodden 
2016) have found that parties use controversial issues as a campaign strategy to lure cross-pressured 
voters (i.e., voters subject to contradictory political leanings) in elections in which policy preference and 
partisanship are in conflict. Conversion affects around a 10% of the electorate in established democracies 
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Finkel and Schrott 1995; Martnez i Coma 2008; Garca-Viuela 2014), although 
its size is much larger in countries in which partisan identities are weak and campaign spending is highly 
asymmetric (Greene 2011). 
 
																																																								
1 The actual effect of the abundant political information available in the campaign period remains an open empirical 
question. For example, McCann and Lawson (2006) find that campaign information does not erode the gap in 
political knowledge due to different levels of education. In contrast, Fourier (2006) finds that campaigns do reduce 
the variance in political information among the electorate, although substantial individual-level differences remain 
after the campaign. 
More recent research has explored a fourth effect of campaigns: demobilization. Intended or not as a 
campaign effect, some survey respondents report their willingness to vote in the pre-campaign period, but 
they end up abstaining on Election Day. This behaviour might be a result of several factors, such as 
alienation by the negative tone of campaign rhetoric or disappointment either at the personal qualities 
exhibited by the candidates or the policy proposals included in partiesÕ platforms (Ansolabehere et al. 
1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Martnez i Coma 2008). 
 
In this paper we focus on the effects of campaigns on votersÕ conversion. To contribute to the literature on 
elections we posit three hypotheses related to the spatial and the valence theories of voting behaviour. 
According to the former, partiesÕ policy proposals and citizensÕ preferences over them can be represented 
in a linnear space. In this model, voters support the party/candidate whose policy proposals are closest to 
them in the ideological axis. While this approach has been particularly influential on voting research in 
the last 60 years, relatively little is known about the scenario in which the minimal distance to a voter is 
the same for two parties. Downs (1957) and Enelow and Hinich (1984) argue that individuals are more 
likely to abstain when the utility differential between two parties decreases (abstention due to 
indifference). Within this framework, Leighley and Nagler (2012) showed that turnout would rise in the 
United States if parties offered more distinct choices. Rodon (2016), however, contested their findings in 
a paper with a large sample of countries and concluded that the effect of party indifference is relatively 
small compared to other factors postulated in the turnout literature. 
 
Notwithstanding these contributions, prior research has neglected the potential impact of ideological 
indifference on the likelihood of party switching over the election campaign. Recent studies show, 
however, that the rising volatility in partiesÕ vote shares over elections held in advanced democracies in 
the last decades is associated with votersÕ indifference between parties (Dassonneville and Hooghe 
forthcoming). Therefore, we argue that ideological indifference might be a significant factor of party 
switching during the campaign period. In the spatial literature, voters that are equally distant from two 
parties would either abstain or decide which party to vote for by flipping a coin. We do not suggest that 
indifferent voters decide by chance which party to vote for. We argue instead that if they reported a party 
preference in the pre-campaign period, they are less likely to stick to it on Election Day and more prone to 
revise it during the campaign period. Hence, our first hypothesis is:  
 
H1: Ideologically indifferent voters are more likely to change their party preference over the campaign. 
	
We compare this hypothesis to the valence politics view. The valence perspective fundamentally departs 
from the Downsian spatial framework. According to Downs (1957), parties compete over policies on 
which they dissent. In contrast, Stokes (1963) argues that certain policies are characterized by general 
agreement. Within this valence frame, there are goals that are Òpositively or negatively valued by the 
electorate [as a whole]Ó (Stokes 1963, p. 373). So, parties do not compete by relocating themselves closer 
to the electorate since, by definition, everyone (parties and voters) agrees on the ends. ThatÕs why the 
logic of political competition is based on claiming credibility and competence in the achievement of the 
shared goals (De Sio and Weber 2014). In recent times, valence models of voting behaviour have been 
found to outperform spatial accounts of party choice (Sanders et al. 2011). Here we study two ways in 
which valence concerns can play a role in campaign dynamics: the assessments of partiesÕ competence 
and the evaluation of candidates by voters.  
 
First, there is what we call heterogeneity in assessments of partiesÕ competence, which we define as the 
situation in which one voter believes that no single party is the most competent in all policy areas. This is 
an important topic in the voting behaviour literature. For example, Converse (1964, p. 3) coins the term 
Òbelief systemÓ to refer to Òa configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or functional interdependenceÓ. Similarly, Zaller (1992, p. 113) 
argues that ÒAn extensive research literature has documented that people who are liberal (or 
conservative) on one issue tend to be relatively liberal (or conservative) on a range of other issues. This 
tendency is most commonly explained by means of the concept of Ôattitude constraintÕ, which implies that 
one sort of attitude (ideological orientation) constraints other attitudes (policy preferences)Ó. The 
existence of this Òbelief systemÓ or Òattitude constraintÓ explains why some voters support all the policies 
advocated by a single party.  
 
Yet, there are voters whose political attitudes are not constrained in the way described by these authors. 
For instance, voters could support the policies of a party on moral issues (like abortion) and the policies 
of a different party on economic issues (like taxes). Within the framework of valence politics, we believe 
that heterogeneous assessments of partiesÕ competence can explain votersÕ deviations from their choice 
before the election campaign. In our view, such voters might be more permeable to campaign messages 
for three main reasons.  
 
First, following Zaller (1992), while the behaviour of voters with homogenous perceptions of partiesÕ 
ability across issues could be predicted from those predispositions, the behaviour of voters with 
heterogenous valence assessments could not. As a result, there is more room for change in voting 
behaviour over the election campaign for the latter. On the contrary, voters with homogeneous 
evaluations of what is the most competent party would not have conflicting views about which party to 
support depending on their valence assessments, leading consequently to higher levels of stability over 
time.  
 
The new literature on campaigns (Carsey and Layman 2006; Killian and Wilcox 2008; Hillygus and 
Shields 2009; Willmann 2011; Gallego and Rodden 2016) has studied the choice of voters that face a 
dilemma between party allegiance and party policies over issues that are highly relevant to them. Such 
voters might not vote for the party they normally support if it offers policies contrary to their firmly held 
moral beliefs, like abortion, gay marriage or immigration. If such voters represent a significant segment of 
the electorate, party elites might design a campaign discourse tailored to exploit the inner confict of those 
voters over issues of great expressive importance to them. So, the campaign might have a conversion 
effect by altering the competing incentives of cross-preassured partisans when they have to decide for 
which party to vote for.  
 
Secondly, campaign information is more crucial for voters with heterogeneous valence. Rational 
ignorance theory argues that voters have no incentives to collect information about party platforms or 
candidatesÕ qualities. Yet, over the campaign parties announce their policy proposals and emphasize some 
issues while understating others. This information might sway the vote intention reported by voters before 
partiesÕ final manifestos were made public because voters can realize the implications of the policies 
included in the party platforms. Furthermore, by making some issues more salient, campaigns increase the 
weight that voters attach to specific issues (priming effect). For voters with non-uniform assessments of 
partiesÕ competence, it is more likely that the party they thought the most able to handle the issue that 
becomes dominant in the weeks before the election is not the same that the party they planned to support 
before the campaign started. If this occurs, such voters will be more disposed to change their party choice 
on Election Day. 
 
Finally, voters update their perception of partiesÕ ability to handle various issues in the campaign period. 
We claim that the working of this updating process is not the same across different values of our measure 
of heterogeneity in competenceÕs assessments. For voters that have a uniform perception of partiesÕ 
valence across issues, the most likely outcome of the updating process is reinforcement. These voters are 
probably the ones that exhibit higher levels of selective exposure to the media, making campaign change 
even more unlikely. By contrast, cross-pressured voters might be more receptive to campaign messages. 
If the information they receive favours a party different from their pre-campaign choice, an opportunity 
window for party switching opens. 
 
To sum it up, we expect campaigns to create more volatility in the electoral choice of voters with 
heterogeneous assessments of partiesÕ competence than in the decision of voters who think that a single 
party is the best equipped to handle all policy issues. We hypothesize that such voters will seek more 
information during the campaign because they are less sure about which party they should vote for on 
Election Day. Different types of information are made readily available in the campaign period: from 
issue saliency to partiesÕ expertise. When this new information finds the fertile ground for change 
provided by a heterogeneous structure of partiesÕ ability assessments, it is more likely to observe changes 
in the pre-campaign vote choice. In contrast, voters with uniform assessments of partiesÕ competence tend 
to make up their mind well before the campaign starts and are more immune to the new information 
released in the campaign period. Probably, because they use other kind of heuristics to decide which party 
to support. Based on these considerations we posit our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Voters with heterogeneous assessments of party competence are more likely to change their party 
preference over the campaign. 
 
An additional valence property has to do with party candidates. In recent times, two of the traditionally 
most relevant predictors of party choice such as social class and party identification seem to have lost 
explanatory power (Franklin et al. 1992; Curtice and Holmberg 2005). Contrarily, candidatesÕ valence 
appears to have gained importance in spite of the growing cynicism of voters towards politicians (Norris 
1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000). According to Bosch and Rico (2003), the process of personalization of 
politics by which leaders have become increasingly influential in elections may be acknowledged in at 
least four different levels: institutions (Carey and Shugart 1995; McAllister 2007; Barber 2010), political 
communication (Butler and Ranney 1992; Swanson and Mancini 1996; Mughan 2000), electorate (Dalton 
1996), and political parties (Scarrow et al. 2000). Although such developments lead to the expectation 
that the quality of candidates shapes votersÕ behaviour, the importance of the process of personalization of 
politics in a campaign context has been seldom tested. For instance, Costa Lobo and Curtice (2014) claim 
that there is strong support for the view that leaders matter for voting behavior, but they do not pay 
attention to possible changes over the campaign period. 
 
From these studies, we take votersÕ appraisal of candidates as proxies for the qualification of party leaders 
to the Prime Minister job. Campaign advertising can influence the credibility and competence of party 
leaders as perceived by the electorate (Bean and Mughan 1989; Stewart and Clarke 1992; Lodge, 
Steenbergen and Brau 1995; Alvarez and Shankster 2006; Rico 2009). Accordingly, we expect voters 
who revise their opinion of party candidates to the Prime Minister office over the campaign period to be 
more likely to move away from their initial vote preference. Thus, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: Voters who update their evaluation of party candidates in the campaign are more likely to change 
their pre-campaign party choice. 
 
 
3. The Spanish system 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use survey data for the three general elections held in Spain between 2008 and 
2015. The Spanish case is particularly relevant for the purpose of this study because it is a closed-list 
proportional representation system. Besides, election campaigns in Spain are extremely nationalized. 
Party platforms have several dominating issues that follow a unique national campaign agenda, while 
district-level issues are very secondary (Martnez i Coma 2008)2. Both features provide an appropriate 
setting to test our hypotheses on campaign conversion.  
 
The three general elections we study are the most recent ones for which panel data are available. We 
concentrate on a period of Spanish politics - 2008 to 2015-, when the Spanish party system was radically 
transformed. Hence, our analysis covers different scenarios. In 2008, the election took place after a period 
characterized by steady economic growth and a strong confrontation between the government and the 
main opposition party, the conservative Partido Popular (PP). The national economy was on the brink of 
a major crisis, but its effects were still not visible and the economy played a minor role in the election 
campaign. This was also the moment when the two parties that have dominated Spanish politics since the 
late eightiesÐPP and PSOE- were at their peak of electoral power. The highly competitive 2008 election, 
returned to office the incumbent Socialist Party (PSOE) with almost 43% of the vote and a plurality of 
seats. As the two main parties garnered 80% of the vote, Spain could be considered a de facto two-party 
system.  
 
The 2011 election took place in the course of a severe economic crisis. The discredit of the PSOE for its 
mismanagement of the economy led to a landslide victory for the opposition PP, but the two dominant 
																																																								
2 Some authors (Lago and Martnez i Coma 2013; Garca-Viuela et al. 2016) argue that campaign management is 
also very nationalized. 
parties still gained 73% of the national vote. However, a major change occurred in 2015. After eight years 
of a profound economic and political crisis, the Spanish party system exploded (Orriols and Cordero 
2016). The 2015 election was characterized by the surprising performance of two new parties, the radical 
left Podemos and the center-right Ciudadanos, which won 65 seats and 40 seats, respectively, in the 350 
seats lower chamber of parliament (Congreso de los Diputados). Although PP and PSOE remained as the 
two most voted parties, the former lost more than a third of its electoral support and the latter obtained its 
worst result since the restoration of democracy in the late seventies. So, in the eight years covered by our 
study Spain transited from a de facto two party-system to a true multi-party system. The fragmentation of 
the party system originated by the electoral success of the new parties forced the repetition of the general 
election in 2016. 
 
The fact that the political context differed so markedly in the three elections contributes to the potential 
generalizability of our findings. In our analysis of the first two elections, we concentrate on PP and PSOE 
because they were the major actors in those campaigns and the only ones that could win the election. 
Media attention during the weeks before each election was strongly focused on them and, consequently, 
these were the parties more likely to be benefited by campaign effects. Yet, the breakup of the party 
system in 2015 and the emergence of Podemos and Ciudadanos changed unexpectedly the electoral 
landscape. Whereas Podemos became an appealing option for disappointed PSOE voters, Ciudadanos 
attracted conservative voters unhappy with the performance of PP«s governments during the crisis. As 
both emergent parties increased the opportunities for conversion, we incorporate them in the analyses of 
the 2015 election. 
 
 
4. Data and Methods 
 
Our empirical analyses uses panel survey data collected by the CIS3 for the Spanish general elections of 
2008, 2011 and 2015. The three panels consist of a pre-election survey conducted two to three weeks 
before the beginning of the official campaign, which in Spain lasts for 14 days, and a post-election survey 
conducted around a month after each general election.4 The CIS surveys measure a wide variety of socio-
economic characteristics and political attitudes by running face-to-face interviews on a representative 
																																																								
3 Although formally dependent on the Spanish government, the CIS is an independent agency with its own legal 
status and funding. Its aim is to conduct scientific studies of Spanish society. 
4 CIS studies 2750-2757, 2915-2920 and 3117-3126. 
sample of the Spanish electorate.5 The panel design of the surveys allows us to study the dynamics of 
individual change.  
 
Our main model includes all respondents that state in the pre-election survey that they have the intention 
of voting for a party.6 That is, we only consider those voters who could potentially be converted. Our 
dependent variable, conversion, takes value 1 if the respondent reports a different voting behavior in each 
wave of the panel, and value 0 if she reports intending to vote (in the pre-election survey) and having 
voted (in the post-election survey) for the same party. In the party models, we take into account the 
individual parties involved in the campaign dynamics when we code the dependent variable. For example, 
conversion to PP takes value 1 when the respondent declares having voted for this party in the post-
election survey but had the intention to vote for a different party in the pre-election survey, and value 0 if 
the voterÕs choice was not PP in either wave of the survey.  
  
We use two types of analysis to assess the validity of our hypotheses. First, we run logistic regressions 
with clustered standard errors by district (i.e., province) as observations within each district may not be 
entirely independent. Secondly, we estimate multilevel models in which we include random intercepts by 
province to account for different propensities to change the reported choice by district. The results of this 
second type of analysis and several robustness tests are included in the online Appendix. 
 
Our main independent variables are ideological indifference, heterogeneity in assessments of partiesÕ 
competence and shifts in the appraisal of party candidates for Prime Minister. Regarding the former, 
respondents were asked in the pre-election survey to place both parties and themselves in a 1 to 10 
ideological scale, in which 1 means an extreme left view and 10 an extreme right view. Our indifference 
variable takes value 1 if the closest party to a voter is equally distant from her than at least a second party 
and value 0 otherwise. We construct the heterogeneous assessments of partiesÕ competence as follows: 
respondents were asked in the pre-election survey which party was in their view most able to handle each 
of several policy issues. This variable is coded 1 if the respondent reported that no single party was the 
most competent to handle all issues and 0 otherwise.7 Hence, this variable takes value 1 if the voter says a 
																																																								
5 Details about survey questions and sampling techniques are available on the Internet at: 
http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas. 
6 Respondents who state in the pre-election survey that they do not know what they are going to do on Election Day 
or report in the post-election survey that they do not remember what they did on Election Day are coded as missing. 
The same applies to people that report a blank or a null vote either in the pre- or the post-election survey or that 
refuse to answer these questions. 
7 The wording of the questions slightly differs over elections. For more information, see the descrption of variables 
in the online Appendix. 
different party is the most able in at least one issue. We also run models with alternative cut-off points: 
reporting that a different party does better in at least two issues or three issues.The results are similar and 
are reported in Table A3 of the online Appendix. To build the candidatesÕ variable for the pooled models, 
we averaged the absolute value of the difference in all candidatesÕ ratings between the post- and the pre-
election waves of the panel.8 Following previous research on voting behavior, we include in the 
econometric specifications a number of control variables, such as absence of party identification, gender, 
age, level of formal education, subjective social class, attendance to religious services, national 
identification, municipality size, left-right ideology, change in the evaluation of the state of the national 
economy during the campaign and exposure to political information from the media. In the online 
Appendix we present the description of all the variables in the models and in Table A1 we show their 
summary statistics. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Campaigns are often assumed to have minimal effects. Yet, they are far from being irrelevant. Figure 1 
confirms the validity of this statement using data from the Spanish general elections examined here. Our 
results show that campaign conversion has become more consequential and this result connects very well 
with the dealignment process registered in established democracies in recent years. We find that in the 
pooled sample for the three elections about 15% of voters changed their reported vote preference during 
the campaign and that campaign conversion increased remarkably over time. The number of converted 
voters raised from 11% in the 2008 election to 21% in the election of 2015. These results convey a clear 
sense of the increasing influence of campaigns and that conversion becomes a more likely behavior in a 
multi-party system. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the econometric specifications that take conversion as dependent variable 
when the three elections and all parties are pooled. Our parameters of interest with regard to valence 
considerations (i.e., heterogeneous assessments of partiesÕ competence and changes in candidatesÕ 
																																																								
8 In the party models, the candidatesÕ variable is simply the difference in the candidateÕs rating of each party over 
the two waves. 
evaluations) have a significant impact (p < 0.01) in all models.9 Yet, the impact of ideological 
indifference is always weaker and fails to reach statistical significance when the controls are included in 
the analysis (see Model 4). Hence, we find strong support for two of our hypotheses since both valence 
variables are found to be relevant to explain citizensÕ updates of voting choices made in the pre-campaign 
period. More to the point, the empirical results highlight valence factors rather than position (i.e., 
ideological proximity) as a better explanation of why voters switch their party choice during the election 
campaign. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The models by election year displayed in Table 2 offer additional evidence on the performance of our key 
explanatory variables. Whereas shifts in candidatesÕ evaluations remain highly significant across 
elections, there are important changes in the performance of ideological indifference and heterogeneous 
assessments of partiesÕ ability over time. In the 2008 election, the last general election held before the 
economic crisis, our positional variable (i.e., ideological indifference) has a weak albeit statistically 
significant influence (p < 0.1) on the probability of changing party choice during the campaign period. By 
contrast, the effect of heterogeneous valence is indistinguishable from zero. However, in the subsequent 
elections of 2011 and 2015, ideological indifference is no longer relevant while our valence variable 
appears in turn as a powerful factor of campaign conversion. So, our findings suggest that campaign vote 
switchers have paid increased attention to valence considerations as the elections in the last years have 
revolved around policy alternatives to manage an ailing national economy.         
 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, the party models shown in Table 3 support the main results presented above. Both valence 
variables are good explanatory factors of campaign conversion for the four parties studied, while 
ideological indifference fails in all instances but one (i.e., the model for PSOE without controls) to reach 
																																																								
9 To account for any potential collinearity between our valence variables (i.e., heterogeneous assessments and 
candidates evaluations), we run an OLS regression taking as dependent variable the difference in candidatesÕ 
evaluations between the pre- and the post-election survey and as independent variables all the variables included in 
the models. As shown in Table A2 of the online Appendix, heterogeneous valence is not a statistically significant 
predictor of change in candidatesÕ evaluations. Besides, we also run multicollinearity tests in which we do not detect 
any risk of multicollinearity in the models in Table 1. The variance inflation factors in model 2 for heterogeneous 
assesments and candidates evaluations are 1.57 and 2.10 respectively, and in model 4, 1.92 and 3.34 respectively. 
This indicates that there are no reasons to be concerned. 
conventional levels of significance. This is an important result, as we do not appreciate remarkable 
variation across parties in terms of conversion in spite of their profound differences with regard to 
ideology and discourse.    
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
On the role played by the control variables, right-wing and older voters are less likely to change their 
party choice over the campaign period in the pooled models. Similarly, religious attendance and 
municipality size tend to decrease and increase, respectively, the probability of changing party 
preferences in the weeks preceding the election. As theorized (Zaller 1992; Shaw 1999; Franz and 
Rideout 2007), party identification provides a Òperceptive filterÓ that allows partisans to oppose political 
messages that are at odds with their beliefs. Consequently, we expect non-partisans to be more open to 
campaign persuasion than partisans. Our results validate this expectation, although not in the 2011 
election or in the case of the new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos. 
 
We also find that voters with higher levels of education are less prone to alter their reported choice in the 
pre-election survey when we pool the data in the overall models (Table 1), although the estimated effect is 
significant only for the 2015 election (Table 2) and for conversion to PP and PSOE (Table 3). Besides, 
changes in the opinion about the performance of the national economy during the campaign period do not 
affect significantly the probability of conversion in the overall models. Yet, when we split the sample by 
parties we find a negative effect on conversion to PP, and a positive effect on conversion to Podemos 
(Table 3). The former effect might be explained by the extended view in the Spanish electorate that PP 
does a good job managing the national economy. So, when voters opinions of the state of the economy 
deteriorate, conversion to PP is more likely. Contrarily, Podemos is generally perceived by the electorate 
as a party that is not well suited to run the national economy, so conversion to Podemos should be more 
likely when voters think that the economy is less of an issue. 
 
As for the media exposure variable, voters who pay more attention to political news are supposed to be 
less willing to alter their party preference in the campaign period (Butler and Stokes 1969). We expect 
such well-informed voters to reach the campaign season with a more definite plan about what to do on 
Election Day (Zaller 2004). Our findings confirm this expectation. The coefficient of the media variable 
has the predicted negative sign in the pooled models (Table 1) and is significant for the 2011 election 
(Table 2) and for Ciudadanos (Table 3). 
 
The evidence provided by our tables is limited by the fact that in logistic regressions the strength of the 
effects cannot be assessed directly from the coefficients. Figures 2 and 3 plot the marginal effects (with 
90% confidence intervals) of the explanatory factors on campaign conversion and allow us to better 
measure the impact of each factor. To be able to compare the impact of the coefficients, all variables have 
been standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Both figures show that the factors with the 
strongest marginal influence on conversion are those related to valence: heterogeneous valence and 
changes in candidatesÕ evaluations. The probability of changing party choice as a result of an increase in 
one standard deviation in the pooled model is around 0.25 and 0.35, respectively. Both effects are of a 
relevant magnitude.  
 
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Likewise, we have calculated the predicted probabilities of conversion associated to changes in the 
evaluation of party candidates. As depicted in Figure 4, the impact of this variable is strikingly similar in 
all elections. Passing from not changing the evaluation of any candidate to the highest possible variation 
with regard to this variable increases the likelihood of campaign conversion by 50%. Yet, substantial 
differences are observed depending on the type of party. As illustrated in Figure 5, the attraction of new 
voters during the campaign period seems to be more driven by variation in the appraisal of the candidates 
of established parties than of the emergent ones. 
 
[FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Finally, in Table 4 we re-estimate the party models taken as reference the party that losses rather than the 
party that wins with conversion behavior. In general, we find consistent results that reinforce our previous 
results. We observe that in all cases improving the evaluation of the candidate of a party decreases the 
likelihood of abandoning him, which is the flip side of the effect found in previous analyses. This is 
farther evidence of the importance of valence for campaign conversion. Likewise, we also find that 
heteregoeneous valence also increases the likelihood of conversion. Voters with mixed preferences are 
more lilely to change the vote intention stated before the campaign starts. Interestingly, however, we find 
now a slightly clearer effect of the impact of ideological indifference during the campaign. In the models 
without covariates, those ideologically indifferent are more likely to convert both from PP and PSOE, 
which are the main traditional parties in Spain. The statistical significance of the results, however, does 
not hold when we include covariates in the model. Still, and although we did not find a clear direction of 
those vote flows in Table 3, we see a partial effect of ideological indifference in facilitating conversion 
from the mainstream parties. The result, in any case, is of smaller magnitude and weaker than the effect of 
valence that we have consistently shown in the paper. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To improve confidence in our results, we test their robustness by conducting additional analyses, which 
are displayed in several tables of the online Appendix. First, we change the cut-off point we use to 
consider that a respondent has heterogeneous valence and the results are similar (Table A3). Secondly, we 
change the specification strategy and estimate multilevel models with random intercepts per province 
(Table A4). In a nutshell, the valence variables outperform once again ideological indifference, which is a 
significant predictor of conversion only in a bivariate regression. Thirdly, we differentiate between 
conversion that benefits major parties (i.e., PSOE and PP) and conversion that benefits smaller parties 
(i.e., all the other). Fourthly, in Table A5 we present results that corroborate the explanatory advantage of 
the valence factors. Fifthly, we show that the core results remain robust to the inclusion of the party that 
the respondent intended to vote in the pre-election wave as a fixed effect (Table A6). Sixthly, Tables A7 
and A8 display regression models that take as dependent variable conversion to and from PSOE, 
respectively.10 These models aim to capture the role played by individual candidates for conversion in the 
campaigns. The effects are consistent over elections, indicating that results were not driven by specific 
candidates. Finally, Table A9 replicates the models in Table 1 including measures of left-right salience 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) as explanatory factors in the models.11This allows us to 
relax the assumption that all issues are equally relevant in the heterogeneous valence variables and 
control for some parties making some issues more salient than others. This accounts also for the fact that 
the assessment of competence might relate to the party itself. Voters can attribute to some parties more 
competence to solve economic issues and to others (such as the leftwing parties) more competence to 
solve social issues. However, once included the CMP measures, the results remain unchanged. 
Altogether, these robustness checks reinforce the conclusions that stem from our main analyses.  
 
6. Conclusions and future research 
 
																																																								
10	We	can	only	estimate	this	effect	for	the	Socialist	Party	because	it	is	the	only	one	that	changes	the	candidate	
over	the	years	(Mr.	Zapatero	in	2008,	Mr.	Rubalcaba	in	2011	and	Mr.	Sanchez	in	2015).	
11	Information	about	left-right	salience	is	taken	from	the	Comparative	Manifesto	Project	(https://manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/).	
The end of cleavage politics (Franklin et al. 1992), the declining importance of party identification 
(Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) and the end of the two-party system that ruled in the past decades in Spain 
and other European countries, make election outcomes more difficult to predict and campaigns more 
salient. Given these patterns, it is surprising the scarce research about the determinants of vote switching 
in the context of election campaigns. On the whole, previous works tend to be focused on the fluctuations 
that occur over two consecutive elections. It is remarkable that research on vote change that happens in 
the period close to Election Day is comparatively rare and that empirical work on the micro-foundations 
of this volatility in multi-party systems is virtually non-existent.  
 
This article is a first attempt to overcome the limitations of previous studies by identifying the factors that 
account for the instability of voting preferences in the campaign period. We find that the heterogeneous 
assessments of partiesÕ competence by voters are a substantial and highly significant predictor of the 
shifts in party choice over the election campaign. According to our evidence, this variable has a strong 
influence on changes in the pre-campaign party choice in the overall models, the individual party models 
and in two of the last three Spanish general elections. Likewise, the literature emphasizes the importance 
of candidates for elections. We offer evidence consistent with such view since in our analysis votersÕ 
changes in perceptions of the quality of candidates are better predictors of the observed volatility of vote 
choice over the campaign than the ideological indifference of voters towards parties.  
 
These findings may have important consequences for partiesÕ political strategies and the way we perceive 
votersÕ incentives to participate in elections. Our results suggest that political entrepreneurs that aim to 
influence voting decisions should focus on valence rather than ideological considerations. Future research 
should develop this result further in several directions. First, it would be interesting to examine whether 
some characteristics of voters make them more prone to be influenced by valence considerations or by 
ideological position when reacting to election campaigns. Secondly, it would be also interesting to assess 
whether the context matters to explain the effects of valence and ideological indifference. In particular, to 
what extent the increasing importance of candidates and valence issues is at least partially motivated by 
the context of economic crisis in which the three studied elections took place. One appealing extension 
would be to complement our analyses with some experimental evidence in which individuals are exposed 
to two types of campaigns (i.e., one focused on ideological concerns and one revolving around valence 
issues) to observe whether conversion effects become more or less likely to happen. Another potential 
venue for future research would be to enquire into votersÕ evaluations of candidates to identify which 
particular traits of a politician are valued by the citizens that decide to change their vote preference during 
the election campaign.  
 Alternatively, this analysis could be extended to a cross-country research design. According to our results, 
valence concerns seem to be the leading driver of campaign conversion in the context of Spanish 
elections. Our analysis by election year also shows the growing numbers of converted voters and the 
increasing influence of valence motivations over time. It would be interesting to shed more light on a 
topic for which comparative evidence at the individual level is certainly scarce by clarifying not only 
whether valence concerns are more relevant than ideology in other democracies, but also how this 
relevance evolves over time beyond the Spanish case. More specifically, future research may analyze how 
campaign conversion occurs nowadays in the absence of economic crisis and emerging parties.  
 
To conclude, this article provides some nuance to the classical argument by many scholars that the 
persuasion effects of campaigns are very limited. For instance, according to Simon (2002), it is unlikely 
that campaigns will accomplish much because party candidates in election campaigns elude dialogue. 
Each candidate chooses to talk about the issues on which she is advantaged (that is, closer to the median 
voter) and avoids discussing themes in which she is disadvantaged. So, in campaigns, candidates will 
Òignore each otherÕs rhetoric and talk past each otherÓ (Simon 2002, p. 150). Our data allow us to track 
changes in the vote intention during the campaign. Our view, confirmed by the empirical results, is that 
campaigns produce more consequential changes in voting preferences. Campaigns allow voters to learn 
about candidates, issues and policies, persuading some individuals to switch their initial vote choice. In 
this paper, we have shown that there are voters (like those with heterogeneous valence) who, in order to 
make their final vote choice, rely on the information conveyed by campaigns and the trustworthiness and 
competence of parties to carry out their policy proposals. Such voters might revise the preference they 
reported when the campaign information was not available to them. So, to the extent that campaigns help 
citizens to make better-informed voting choices, they can be defended as welfare enhancing; that is, as 
instruments to reach an election outcome more representative of the preferences of the electorate. 
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Appendix 
 
Description of variables 
 
Conversion: a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent declares in the post-election 
survey having voted for a party different than the one she intended to vote at the time of the pre-election 
survey, and value 0 if she votes for the same party that intended to vote before the campaign. 
 
Mobilization: a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent intends to abstain at the time of 
the pre-election survey but reports having voted in the post-election survey, and 0 if she intends to abstain 
at the time of the pre-election survey and does so. 
 
Demobilization: a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent intends to vote at the time of 
the pre-election survey but reports having abstained in the post-election survey, and 0 if she intends to 
vote at the time of the pre-election survey and does so. 
 
Ideological indifference: a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the minimum ideological distance 
between the respondent and a party is the same for a second party, and value 0 otherwise. The ideological 
distance is computed on the basis of self-placement and citizensÕ placement of parties on a 1-10 scale, 
where 1 means extreme left and 10 means extreme right. 
 
Heterogeneous assessment of partiesÕ competence: respondents in the pre-election survey are asked which 
party is in their view the most able to handle each of several issues. This variable is coded 1 if the 
respondent reported that no single party is the most competent to handle all issues and coded 0 otherwise. 
In 2008, respondents are asked whether PP would have done a better job as incumbent than PSOE in 13 
different policy domains. There are three possible answers: better, the same or worse. The variable takes 
value 1 if the respondent says that PP and PSOE would have performed better than the other in at least 
one of the different policy domains each, and value 0 otherwise. In 2011, respondents are asked which 
party they consider the most able to handle a list of 15 issues. There are four possible answers: PSOE, PP, 
a third party, or none of them. The variable takes value 1 if the respondent does not answer PSOE, PP or a 
third party in the 15 policy domains, and value 0 otherwise. In 2015, respondents are asked which party 
they consider the most able to handle a list of 14 issues. There are 31 possible answers referred to one 
party each. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the four principal parties (i.e., PP, PSOE, Podemos and 
Ciudadanos) and make the variable take value 1 if the respondent does not say the same party for all 
issues, and value 0 otherwise. The included issues are: employment, education, health, economy, 
European Union, social policy, terrorism (not in 2015), public security, housing, immigration, devolution 
matters, environment, foreign policy, gender equality (not in 2008) and infrastructures (not in 2008). In 
table A3 we use two different cut-off points: reporting a different party in at least two and three issues, 
respectively. 
 
∆ in candidatesÕ evaluations: party candidates were rated in both waves of the election panel using a 0 to 
10 scale, where 0 represents the most unfavorable opinion of a party leader and 10 the most favorable 
opinion. In the pooled model we averaged the absolute value of the difference in all candidatesÕ ratings 
between the post- and the pre-election waves of the panel. We also built a similar variable for each of the 
parties under consideration to capture the difference between the post- and the pre-election opinion of 
each candidate.  
 
No party ID: a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent reports no identification with any 
party and value 0 otherwise. 
 
Female: a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is a female and value 0 otherwise. 
 
Age: a continuous variable that captures how old is the respondent. 
 
Education: a categorical variable that captures the highest level of formal education attained by the 
respondent. The categories are: 0 = no formal schooling, 1 = primary education, 2 = secondary education, 
3 = university education. 
 
Subjective social class: a categorical variable that captures the self-reported social class of the respondent. 
In the 2008 and the 2011 surveys, the variables range from 1 (lower class) to 5 (upper class). In 2015, the 
variable ranges from 1 (lower class) to 10 (upper class). 
 
Religious attendance: a categorical variable that captures the respondentÕs frequency of attendance to 
religious services. It takes value 1 if she attends seldom, 2 if she attends several times a year, 3 if she 
attends once a month, 4 if she attends all Sundays and holidays, and 5 if she attends several times a week. 
 
National identification: a categorical variable that captures the respondentÕs national subjective 
identification. It takes value 1 if the respondent is only identified with Spain, value 2 if she feels more 
Spanish that from her region, value 3 if she feels as Spanish as from her region, value 4 if she feels more 
from her region than Spanish, and value 5 if she is only identified with her region. 
 
Municipality size: a categorical variable that takes value 1 for municipalities of less or equal to 2,000 
inhabitants; value 2 for municipalities between 2,001 and 10,000 inhabitants; value 3 for municipalities 
between 10,001 and 50,000 inhabitants; value 4 for municipalities between 50,001 and 100,000 
inhabitants; value 5 for municipalities between 100,001 and 400,000 inhabitants; value 6 for 
municipalities between 400,001 and 1,000,000 inhabitants; and value 7 for municipalities of more than 
1,000,000 inhabitants. 
 
Left-right ideology: a continuous variable that captures the self-reported ideology of the respondent on a 
scale where 1 means extreme left and 10 means extreme right. 
 
∆ in evaluations of the national economy: this variable captures the variation in the respondentÕs opinion 
of the performance of the national economy between the pre-election and the post-election survey. The 
evaluation of the economy is coded in each survey as 0 if the state of the national economy is perceived as 
bad or very bad; ceded 1 if she perceives it as neither bad nor good; and coded 2 if she thinks it is good or 
very good. The variable used in the model ranges from -2 to 2 and it is the difference between the post-
election assessment and the pre-election assessment. 
 
Media exposure: this is a categorical variable that reflects the respondentÕs self-reported level of media 
exposure about the election. The categories are: 0 = low, 1 = medium, 2 = high. 
  
 Table 1. The determinants of conversion (general models) 
VARIABLES Position Valence Position + 
Valence 
Position + 
Valence + 
Controls 
Ideological indifference 0.226***  0.131* 0.140 
 (0.0728)  (0.0769) (0.114) 
Heterogeneous valence  0.616*** 0.614*** 0.640*** 
  (0.0788) (0.0823) (0.138) 
∆ in candidatesÕ evaluations  0.350*** 0.351*** 0.428*** 
  (0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0732) 
No party ID    0.687*** 
    (0.168) 
Female    -0.220** 
    (0.102) 
Age    -0.0202*** 
    (0.00390) 
Education    -0.194** 
    (0.0945) 
Social class    -0.0529 
    (0.0520) 
Religious attendance    -0.0881 
    (0.0559) 
National identification    0.0740 
    (0.0528) 
Municipality size    0.0313 
    (0.0254) 
LR Ideology    -0.0497* 
    (0.0257) 
∆ in evaluation of the 
national economy 
   -0.0316 
    (0.0752) 
Media exposure    -0.165** 
    (0.0816) 
Constant -2.116*** -2.704*** -2.738*** -1.709*** 
 (0.0801) (0.125) (0.136) (0.454) 
AIC 8090.089 4156.438 4036.063 2505.544    
BIC 8118.776 4189.112 4075.079 2609.785 
Number of Observations 9,622 5,089 4,928 3,401 
Note: Logistic models with standard errors clustered by province in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; year-
fixed effects included but not shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The determinants of conversion (models by year) 
VARIABLES 2008 2011 2015 
Ideological indifference 0.315* 0.403* 0.00950 -0.375 0.0728 0.0536 
 (0.164) (0.233) (0.292) (0.457) (0.0991) (0.131) 
Heterogeneous valence 0.299 0.420* 0.642*** 1.052** 0.699*** 0.740*** 
 (0.257) (0.222) (0.228) (0.415) (0.118) (0.188) 
∆ in candidatesÕ evaluations 0.340*** 0.464*** 0.584*** 0.551*** 0.318*** 0.361*** 
 (0.0784) (0.104) (0.148) (0.169) (0.0537) (0.0919) 
No party ID  0.844***  0.158  0.800*** 
  (0.209)  (0.720)  (0.220) 
Female  -0.120  -0.0215  -0.314** 
  (0.209)  (0.227)  (0.129) 
Age  -0.0210***  -0.00308  -0.0233*** 
  (0.00674)  (0.0137)  (0.00499) 
Education  -0.0756  -0.110  -0.266** 
  (0.134)  (0.295)  (0.135) 
Social class  0.176  0.186  -0.0987* 
  (0.146)  (0.353)  (0.0599) 
Religious attendance  -0.0797  -0.00525  -0.0918 
  (0.0945)  (0.142)  (0.0681) 
National identification  0.280***  0.0583  -0.0371 
  (0.0996)  (0.150)  (0.0705) 
Municipality size  -0.0445  0.190***  0.0454 
  (0.0565)  (0.0724)  (0.0380) 
LR Ideology  -0.0661  -0.0438  -0.0333 
  (0.0435)  (0.0825)  (0.0331) 
∆ evaluation of the economy  -0.0265  -0.544  -0.0103 
  (0.107)  (0.375)  (0.101) 
Media exposure  0.0610  -0.634**  -0.200 
  (0.134)  (0.271)  (0.122) 
Constant -2.714*** -3.270*** -3.451*** -3.691* -2.215*** 0.369 
 (0.153) (0.795) (0.352) (2.095) (0.158) (0.551) 
AIC 1312.054 855.7708    312.4845    313.7479 2260.731   1356.264     
BIC 1334.273 934.4342 376.3782 377.6416 2283.602 1435.74 
Number of Observations 1,910 1,400 770 523 2,248 1,478 
Note: Logistic models with standard errors clustered by province in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 3. The determinants of conversion (models by party) 
VARIABLES Conversion to PP Conversion to PSOE Conversion to Podemos Conversion to Ciudadanos 
Ideological indifference -0.0960 0.142 0.217* 0.0987 0.130 -0.232 -0.133 0.0989 
 (0.171) (0.177) (0.114) (0.141) (0.183) (0.388) (0.290) (0.336) 
Heterogeneous valence 0.430*** 0.498** 0.597*** 0.513*** 0.966*** 0.652** 0.383* 0.671** 
 (0.149) (0.205) (0.117) (0.161) (0.172) (0.269) (0.231) (0.314) 
∆ in candidatesÕ evaluations 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.243*** 0.279*** 0.199*** 0.262*** 0.259*** 0.279*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0421) (0.0386) (0.0449) (0.0363) (0.0423) (0.0566) (0.0506) 
No party ID  1.197***  0.453**  0.188  0.558 
  (0.259)  (0.179)  (0.593)  (0.612) 
Female  -0.223  -0.183  -0.212  -0.348 
  (0.193)  (0.170)  (0.214)  (0.398) 
Age  -0.00585  -0.0141**  -0.0371***  -0.0309*** 
  (0.00598)  (0.00548)  (0.00970)  (0.00925) 
Education  -0.263*  -0.631***  0.0438  -0.244 
  (0.137)  (0.131)  (0.240)  (0.265) 
Social class  -0.0722  -0.0160  -0.220  0.0684 
  (0.0786)  (0.0770)  (0.141)  (0.124) 
Religious attendance  0.157**  -0.0977  -0.0974  -0.395** 
  (0.0667)  (0.0703)  (0.165)  (0.180) 
National identification  -0.164*  -0.115  -0.185  -0.0538 
  (0.0993)  (0.0906)  (0.163)  (0.161) 
Municipality size  0.0735  -0.0346  0.170**  0.135 
  (0.0529)  (0.0594)  (0.0761)  (0.102) 
LR Ideology  0.626***  -0.472***  -0.421***  0.245*** 
  (0.0616)  (0.0420)  (0.0898)  (0.0744) 
∆ evaluation of the economy  -0.455***  0.145  0.678***  -0.0817 
  (0.124)  (0.134)  (0.163)  (0.254) 
Media exposure  -0.236  -0.162  -0.226  -0.439** 
  (0.173)  (0.107)  (0.155)  (0.205) 
Constant -3.899*** -6.129*** -2.397*** 2.172*** -3.294*** 1.423* -3.692*** -2.516** 
 (0.200) (0.770) (0.148) (0.616) (0.182) (0.858) (0.226) (1.012) 
AIC 1617.921 1034.681    2089.443 1264.182     987.1164 453.8276    479.1031 351.2665 
BIC 1656.308 1135.242 2127.882 1367.53 1009.619 533.8817 501.1579 427.7297 
Number of Observations 4,438 2,739 4,476 3,227 2,050 1,536 1,833 1,209 
Note: Logistic models with standard errors clustered by province in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1; year-fixed effects included but not shown. 
Table 4. The determinants of conversion from different political parties 
         
VARIABLES Conversion 
from PP 
Conversion 
from PP 
Conversion 
from PSOE 
Conversion  
from PSOE 
Conversion 
from Podemos 
Conversion 
from 
Podemos 
Conversion 
from Cs 
Conversion 
from Cs 
         
Ideological indifference 0.420*** 0.0244 0.349*** 0.176 -0.0353 0.244 0.0849 0.181 
 (0.122) (0.171) (0.131) (0.189) (0.212) (0.401) (0.207) (0.214) 
Heterogeneous valence 0.609*** 0.297** 0.682*** 0.794*** 0.437* 0.407 0.522** 0.600** 
 (0.136) (0.151) (0.152) (0.190) (0.261) (0.587) (0.211) (0.272) 
∆ candidatesÕ evaluations -0.485*** -0.467*** -0.284*** -0.336*** -0.258*** -0.343** -0.401*** -0.407*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0475) (0.0364) (0.0465) (0.0693) (0.134) (0.0586) (0.0917) 
No party ID  0.240  0.250  -0.0304  0.655 
  (0.182)  (0.396)  (0.715)  (0.430) 
Female  -0.420***  -0.114  -0.212  -0.216 
  (0.138)  (0.169)  (0.540)  (0.215) 
Age  -0.0153**  -0.0223***  0.00816  0.00572 
  (0.00614)  (0.00548)  (0.0173)  (0.00851) 
Education  -0.431***  -0.199  -0.475  -0.480* 
  (0.129)  (0.131)  (0.475)  (0.255) 
Social class  0.0531  -0.142*  0.137  -0.166 
  (0.0954)  (0.0781)  (0.184)  (0.102) 
Religious attendance  -0.112  -0.146  -0.629*  0.111 
  (0.0826)  (0.0941)  (0.376)  (0.118) 
National identification  0.282***  0.201  0.263  -0.157 
  (0.105)  (0.135)  (0.360)  (0.138) 
Municipality size  0.111*  0.0365  -0.120  -0.103 
  (0.0579)  (0.0459)  (0.128)  (0.0787) 
LR ideology  -0.484***  -0.351***  0.0902  -0.218** 
  (0.0753)  (0.0889)  (0.143)  (0.0945) 
∆ evaluation of the economy  -0.0574  -0.710***  0.364  0.0935 
  (0.143)  (0.130)  (0.547)  (0.207) 
Media exposure  -0.233*  -0.266**  0.800*  -0.288 
  (0.132)  (0.118)  (0.426)  (0.194) 
Constant -3.050*** 0.855 -2.987*** 0.473 -1.610*** -2.637 -1.209*** 2.664** 
 (0.198) (0.675) (0.181) (0.676) (0.266) (2.032) (0.230) (1.108) 
         
AIC 1403.107 1050.847 1748.458 1088.22 467.827 174.578 611.945 406.401 
BIC 1438.555 1148.963 1783.723 1182.79 484.455 220.132 628.796 463.433 
Observations 2,719 2,372 2,637 1,926 472 154 499 331 
Note: Logistic models with standard errors clustered by province in parentheses; year-fixed effects included but not shown; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figures  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Magnitude and  evolution of campaing conversion 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal Effect of Ideological Indifference, Heterogeneous Valence and other 
Independent Variables (general models and models by year) 
 
 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated according to Model 4 in Table 21 and Models 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2. 
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Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Ideological Indifference, Heterogeneous Valence and other 
Independent Variables (models by party) 
 
Note: Marginal effects are calculated according to Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 3.    
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Figure 4. Change in CandidatesÕ Evaluations and Predicted Probability of Conversion 
(general models and models by year) 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated according to Model 4 in Table 2, and Models 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2.    
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Figure 5. Change in CandidatesÕ Evaluations and Predicted Probability of Conversion 
(models by party) 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated according to Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 3.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
